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I contrast a first price (discriminatory, Dutch) auction to a second
price (competitive, English, Vickrey) auction. Two results are obtained.
First, when the seller or the potential buyers are risk averse, the first
price auction is more efficient ex post than the second price auction.
Second, if the buyers are not too risk averse, the first price auction
Pareto dominates ex ante the second price auction. These results are
derived in a setting where (1) the bidders have identical utility functions,
(2) the bidders' evaluations of the item are independent and identically
distributed ex ante
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and (3), most crucially, the seller announces before-
have a reservation price which every bid must exceed.

RISK AVERSION AND THE EFFICIENCY OF FIRST
AND SECOND PRICE AUCTIONS
Steven Matthews*
University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana
July 1979
1. Introduction
I contrast a first price (discriminatory, Dutch) auction to a sec-
ond price (competitive, English, Vickrey) auction. Two results are ob-
tained. First, when the seller or the potential buyers are risk averse,
the first price auction is more efficient ex post than the second price
auction. Second, if the buyers are not too risk averse, the first price
auction Pareto dominates ex ante the second price auction. These results
are derived in a setting where (1) the bidders have identical utility
functions, (2) the bidders' evaluations of the item are independent and
identically distributed ex ante , and (3) , most crucially, the seller
announces beforehand a reservation price which every bid must exceed.
The logic of the first result is simple. A sale does not occur,
because no bid is cast, whenever the highest value among the bidders is
less than the reservation price. In the second price auction and often
the first price auction, the seller sets a reservation price greater
than his actual cost. Consequently, a sale may not occur even though
some bidder values the item more than its cost. But the item is sold
more frequently in the first price auction, since the seller sets a
lower reservation price in the first price auction whenever he or the
*I would like to thank Richard Kihlstrom and Francoise Schoumaker
for useful comments.
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bidders are risk averse. Therefore the first price auction is ex post
more efficient.
The second result is obtained by showing that if both auctions have
the same reservation price, then the seller's random profits in the
second price auction are dominated, in the sense of second degree stoch-
astic dominance, by his profits in the first price auction. A conjecture
of Vickrey [1961] follows, namely, that a risk averse seller prefers the
first price auction. Risk neutral buyers also prefer the first price
auction, since a lower reservation price in the first price auction causes
the expected sale price to also be lower. Consequently, if the seller
is risk averse and the buyers are not very risk averse, every agent pre-
fers ex ante the first price auction.
Both results seemingly contradict results obtained in the litera-
ture since Vickrey [1961], The difference is due to the inclusion here
of risk aversion and seller reservation prices. I comment further on
the literature in the concluding section.
2. Framework
The seller conducts an auction to sell one item to one of n possi-
ble buyers. The buyers will also be referred to as bidders. Each buyer
i = l,2,...,n values the item at v.. The value v. is known to i but is
regarded as a random variable by the seller and the other buyers. Each
buyer regards the values of the other buyers as independently and iden-
tically distributed. The seller also regards the bidders' values as in-
dependently and identically distributed. All agents attribute the same
marginal distribution function F(v) to each value. F is assumed to satisfy
the regularity assumption:
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Al. (i) F has a continuous density function f
;
(ii) f(v) > if and only if v e [y_,v] ; and
(iii) -z—— is a strictly increasing function on [v,v].
Assumption Al (iii) will serve two purposes: (1) it is a sufficient
condition for there to be a unique, interior solution to the seller's
problem in the second price auction (proposition 1), and (2) since it is
a global property, it allows global comparative static (proposition 2)
and between-auction (theorem 1) comparisons to be made. Essentially
Al (iii) requires that the density function not decrease too quickly.
Most standard distributions satisfy it.
The useful derived probability functions are the density and dis-
tribution functions of the maximum value,
gj-(x) = nF(x) n
"1
f(x) and G^x) = F(x)n
,n n
and the density and distribution functions of the second greatest value,
g^(x) = n(n-l)F(x) n
~2 (l-F(x))f(x) and
G*(x) = nF(x) n_1 - (n-l)F(x) n .
The buyers all have the same utility function a,, of income. The
a
seller has a utility function u of income. Both functions satisfy
A2. u and u„ are both concave, strictly increasing, and twice
continuously differentiable.
The seller incurs a cost c (y_ _< c < v) for providing the item.
Hence, if w is the sale price, the seller's utility is u (w-c) if the item
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is sold and u„(0) if it is not sold. Similarly, a bidder's utility is
u_(v. - w) if he purchases the item and uR (0) otherwise.
The mechanics of the two auctions are as follows. In either auction
the seller first publicly sets a reservation price r, which is inter-
2
preted as his declared cost. Then any bidder who wishes submits a sealed
bid that must not be less than r. If any bid is submitted in the second
price auction, the item is sold to the high bidder at a price w„ that is
equal to the second highest bid or, if only one bid is submitted, equal
to r. If any bid is submitted in the first price auction, a sale is
made to the highest bidder at a price w.. that is equal to his own bid.
The subsequent models also apply to two variations of these pro-
cedures. First, the bids can be oral rather than sealed. As Vickrey
[1961] observes, in this framework the first price sealed-bid auction
is strategically isomorphic to an oral Dutch (descending) auction, and
the second price sealed-bid auction is isomorphic to an oral English
(ascending) auction.
The second variation is that the reservation price need not neces-
sarily be announced. If it is kept secret, but the bidders know of its
3
existence, then the bidders must bid according to what they think it
is. When the bidders are in a Nash equilibrium, their expectations
about the reservation price (and each others' bidding strategies) will
be correct. The seller will be assumed to act like a Stackelberg mono-
polist, taking into account how bidders' strategies depend on the
reservation price when he sets it to maximize his expected utility.
Hence the equilibrium notion may still be applicable when the reser-
4
vaticn price is not announced.
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3. Second Price Auction
The dominant strategy of a bidder in a second price auction is to
submit a bid equal to his true value (Vickrey [1961]). An additional
proviso is that a bidder will not bid if his value is less than the
reservation price. Hence the price w„ is equal to the maximum of the
reservation price and the second highest value. Therefore the seller's
expected utility from setting a reservation price r is
u_(x-c)g^(x)dx + u_(r-c)[G?(r) - chr)] + uAQ)Ghv) .on sun b n
r
The first order condition for maximizing this expression with respect
to r reduces to
(D
U
S
Cr'C)
.
f(DW
u
s
(r-c) - u
g
(0) 1 - F(r) *
Assumptions Al and A2 insure that there is a unique solution r„ to (1),
and that r_ solves the seller's maximization problem. Furthermore, A2
implies that the left side of (1) is infinite at r = c. Therefore we
have
Proposition 1 : The seller's optimal reservation price r„ in the second
price auction is the solution to (1) , is independent of the number of
bidders, and is strictly greater than the cost c.
Proposition 1 indicates that the second price auction is not
(ex post ) efficient when the seller can set a reservation price. With
positive probability a sale that should occur will net occur, i.e.,
with positive probability the highest value v will satisfy c < v < r„.
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Kowever, the auction is more efficient if the seller is more risk averse.
A more risk averse seller sets a lower reservation price.
Proposition 2 : Let u and u„ be two utility functions satisfying A2,
with the absolute risk aversion of u uniformly greater than that of u .
Then a seller with utility function u sets a lower reservation price in
the second price auction than does a seller with the utility function u .
Proof ; The function u satisfies
u^(x) u£(x)
> _
u,Ux) u,Ux)
for all x, which implies that
ul(r-c) ul(r-c)
(2) § < *
u
s
(r-c)-u
s
(0) u
s
(r-c)-u
s
(0)
for all r > c (Pratt [1964]). A2 implies that both ratios in (2) are de-
creasing functions of r. Let r„(resp. r„) be the reservation price of the
seller with utility function u (resp. u ). If r„
_>_ r„, then (1) and
(2) imply
f(r
2
) f(r
2 )
<
1 - F(r
2
) 1 - F(r
2 )
But this inequality and r„
_> r„ contradict Al. Hence r„ < r„. ^
4. First Price Auction
Bidders do not have a dominant bidding strategy in a first price
auction. However, viewing the auction as a game of incomplete information,
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there is a symmetric "Bayesian equilibrium" in the sense of Harsanyi
[1967], That is, there is a bidding function b(v,r) such that each
bidder can do no better than bid b = b(v,r) when he has value v,
is in a first price auction that has a reservation price r, and every
other bidder bids in accordance with the function b(*,r). This equilib-
rium concept has been used for auctions since Vickrey [1961],
Proposition 3 ; The unique differentiable and increasing equilibrium
b(v,r), defined for v >_ r, is the solution to the differential equation
(3)
db_ , n f (v) v^>-v°>
_
^~1}
F(v) ) u^(v-b)
that satisfies b(r) = r. Equivalently, b(v,r) is implicitly defined by
(4) Ugtv-bCv.r)] - UgCO) =
rv
u^[x-b(x,r)] <sL\
n-l
F(v) q:c.
Proof : It is relatively well-known that (3) and the initial condition
b(r,r) = r characterize the equilibrium, e.g., Ortega-Reichart [1968],
Wilson [1977], Holt [1977], Harris and Raviv [1978], and Samuelson [1978]
derive similar expressions. Assumptions Al and A2 can be used to show
that b(v,r) actually is an equilibrium. I indicate here only how (3) is
derived. The function b(v,r) increases in v. Hence, if a is a function
defined by b(a(p),r) = p, then a bidder who bids p when the others use
b has a probability of winning equal to Pr(p <_ max b(v.,r)) = F(c(p))
i<n-l
His expected utility is
n-l
u
B
(v-p)F(a(p)) n
"1
+ u
B
(0)[l-F(o(p)) n
"1
].
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Eecause b(v,r) is an equilibrium, the first order condition for maximizing
this expression with respect to p must be satisfied by p = b(v,r).
Substitution of p = b(v,r) into the first order condition yields (3) as
a necessary condition for b(v,r) to be an equilibrium. The fact that
b(r) = r follows from the observation that b(r) < r implies that a bidder
with value v = r could do better by bidding greater than b(r) and less
than r. Expression (4) is derived by writing (3) as
-F(v) n_1u^(v-b(v,r))b
v
(v,r) + (n-l)F(v) n
" 2
f (v) [u
B
(v-b(v,r))-u
B
(0) ]
+ FCv^uJCv-bCv.r)) = f(v)*S{(rt(v,i)).
Integrating both sides from r to v results in
[u
B
(x-b(x,r))-u
B
(0)]F(x) n
~1
u^[x-b(x,r)]F(x) n
"1
dx.
Because b(r,r) = r, this expression is (4).
Expression (4) implies that a bidder bids strictly less than his
value in a first price auction, except when his value is equal to the
reservation price. If bidders are risk neutral, then (4) can be solved
to yield
b*(v,r) = v - [y^r-] dx
(4*) = FCv)'^"^ ! I x(n-l)F(x) n
"2f(x)dx + rF(x) n_1
1 t ^
max (x,r) —
:
dx.
G
n-l^
v)
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Hence a buyer's bid is equal to the expectation of his competitors'
values, where the seller is treated as a competitor with value r and
the buyer's expectation is taken conditional upon his own value being
the greatest.
Another useful implication of proposition 1 is that risk, averse
bidders bid more than if they were risk neutral. If u" < 0, then (3)
a
*
implies that b (v,r) > b (v,r) at any v for which b(v,r) = b*(v,r).
Since b(r,r) = b*(r,r), it follows that b(v,r) > b*(v,r) for all v > r.
Now we consider the seller's problem. Because the sale price w
is equal to b(v,r), where v is the maximum value, the seller's expected
utility from setting the reservation price at r isTil
u„[b(x,r)-c]g';(x)dx + u.WJG'd).
o n on
; r
The first order condition for maximizing this with respect to r is
(6) u'[b(x,r)-c]b (x,r)gj;(x)dx = [u_(r-c)-u_(0)]gj;(r).
o r n o o n
J r
Because the left side of (6) is positive, so is the right side. Hence
any solution r to (6) is greater than c. Therefore we have
Proposition 4 : An optimal reservation price r.. for the seller in the
first price auction exists and is either equal to c or satisfies (6) and
is strictly greater than c.
5. Ex Post Comparison
Given our simple framework, both auctions result in either the item
not being sold or in it being sold to the bidder with the maximum value.
Furthermore, the value of a winning bidder in either auction is greater
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than the seller's cost. Both auctions are consequently efficient in
every state of the world in which a sale occurs in both auctions. The
two auctions are equally efficient in any state of the world in which
a sale does not occur in both auctions. However, one auction can still
be ex post more efficient if the set of states of the world in which it
results in a sale strictly includes the set of states in which the other
auction results in a sale. Theorem 1 shows that the first price auction
is more efficient, in this sense, than the second price auction if the
seller or the buyers are risk averse. Because risk aversion implies
r. < r„, the set of states in which a sale occurs in the first price
auction, { (v, ,...,v )|max v. > r.,}, strictly includes the set
1 n ' i—l
of states in which a sale occurs in the second price auction,
{(v. v ) |max v >_ r2 >.
Theorem 1 ; Given Al and A2, there exists r* such that
(i) uj = ug = r=> c < ^ = r2 = r*,
6
(ii) ujj < u'^ = :=> c <_ r
x
< r
2
= r*, and
(iii) u" < —> c <_ r < r < r*.
The proof requires a lemma.
Lemma 1 ; Suppose v_ < r < v. Then b (v,r)F(v) = F(r)
If u" < 0, then < b (v,r)F(v) n
"1
< F(r) n_1 for any v > r.
o — r
Proof ; Differentiation of (4*) yields the result for b*. So assume
ui' < 0. We first show that b (v,r) >^ 0. Choose r such that v > r > r.
Then (4) implies b(r,r) < r = b(r,r). Assume there exists some b and
v 1 > r such that b = b(v',r) = b(v',r). Then, because the differential
equation (3) has a unique solution satisfying the initial condition
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b(r') b, b(v,r; - b<v,r/ for all v > r. This contradiction implies
b(v,r; * b(v,r> for all v > r. Continuity and b(r,rj > b(r,rj now imply
Hov define
»(v#W - - , -,—n .u^.V-r,,
i«ote that u£ < iapliee that at (v,b; ' -1. Differentiating (3) with
respect to r yields
b 'v,r, « 'r.-lj |tta Cv#b)t Cv#r).vr t<ij p r
H < refore
^/v.r/F'v^" 1}
(5) —^-— b^f^Kf)1 + b
r
(»,t)(*-l)l(T)w!(f)
« 'n-ljb (T,r)FW*'2f(») K (v,bj + lj < 0.
r b —
.., .'.'..', - ' is an identity is r, so that . f r,/j - , f r,zj - I,
Also, (3), b'r.r, - r, and F(r; > imply b 'r.r, 0. Hence
b 'r,r/ 1. Thus continuity, f ^j, ar.a (L < -1 inply that
r
n—
L
.'/,.','// ' is a strictly decreasing function of v on some interval
con*. : : . : ..;/ r. Therefore, for any •/ - t
,
?roof of Theorem 1 : Let r* Le defined ae the r„ the seller sete when
u" - u" - 0. Since v.. Is Independent of u
u ,
r „ - r* if u" < u" - U.
Al*0, propoelt lOfl 2 ljapllfcb r, < r* Li ." < 0* It only remains to show
r. < r. , with equality holding if and only if u" - >j" - Q.
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If r c, then proposition 1 implies r » r , . IWr.ce we can as-
sume c < r., so that r. satisfies ^e>) . Substitution of nF(,x) t\x)
for s (x) into ^c) yields, upon rearrangement,
u'U.-O fu
x
)
u
s
(rrc)-us (0)
p' u^ibi.x.r^-c]
n ^ b i,x,r.)
b\x)
FU^
n-1
t(x)4> .
For any r. - x < v, b^x,r.) > r. implies that
• rvw n i f < 1 if u" v o
u^rrO [ - 1 if u^ - 0.
Furthermore, lemma 1 implies that
°iV**i> FUi)
r < 1 if u" v o
1 - l if u£ - u.
Therefore, if u" - U or u|! ^ 0, th
b s
en
u'(rrc) f(rx )
u
s
(r
1
-c)-u
s
C0)
f(x)dx
r
l
1-FU
1
)
and the inequality is an equality if u" - u" - 0. If u!J v or u" « 0,
and if r <_ r. , then
f(r.,) u^r -c)
1-F(r„) u,,U.,-c)-u
c (0)
u'Cr^c) e(r,)
- a8 (r1-«)-us (0) 1-fu^)
»
a contradiction of -—- strictly increasing. Hence r. < r, it u" <
i-f 1 b
or u" < 0. A similar argument shows that r
1
- r, it u" - u" - 0. q
-13-
This section concludes with an example based on the benchmark dis-
tribution, the uniform. Let F(x) = x on the interval [0,1]. Let
Ug(x) = xa (0 < a <_ 1) and ug (x) = x
S
(0 < s <_ 1) . Let m = 1 + (n-l)a .
Then simple calculation yields
b(v,r) -'[£* + <k&nl.m m v
The optimal reservation price in the second price auction is
c+s
r
2 1+s
*
When the seller and bidders are risk neutral (s = a = 1) , then r. r„ =
r* = (l+c)/2. Notice that r < r* if s < 1. For simplicity, assume now
that c = 0. If r. > then r.. satisfies
(7) r* =
r
i
U
& + b®V@r -*** •
This expression poses difficulties, so only polar cases will be examined.
First, if a < 1 then m-n = (n-l)(l-a)a + as n + ». Therefore, taking
limits in (7) yields r. » as n + » if a < 1. On the other hand, if a = 1
1/s l/s
then m = n and r. -* (1/2) as n * °°. Although (1/2) is less than r„,
it is certainly greater than zero; it appears that the difference between
r_ and r
1 is greatest when there are many bidders and they are risk averse,
rather than when only the seller is risk averse. If s = 1, then either
large numbers of bidders or high risk aversion among bidders results in
r. = 0:
if 2 < m-n = (n-1) (—
)
3.
1 1 / , vl/(m-n-l)(n-m+2) otherwise
,
-14-
6. Ex Ante Comparison
This section addresses the following question: before the auction is
held and before the buyers know their values, which type of auction should
the seller and the buyers each prefer?
The following lemma is fundamental. It states that whenever the same
reservation price is set in the two auctions, the expected sale price will
be greater in the first price auction. The two expected sale prices will
be equal only if bidders are risk neutral. Vickrey [1961] first proved a
special case of this lemma and Butters [1975], Holt [1978], Harris and
Raviv [1978], and especially Samuelson [1978] have proved more general
cases. An alternative, relatively short proof is sketched here.
Lemma_2: If the same reservation price r is set in both auctions, then
E(w..[sale) >_ E(w„|sale). Equality holds if uIJ = 0, and strict inequality
holds if u£ < 0.
Proof ; The following chain utilizes (4*) and holds for u£ 0.
E(w. I sale) [l-G^r)] =
1 n
v
ib*(v,r)g
n
(v)dv
r
-r<
'V
x(n-l)F(x) n
~2f(x)dx + rF(r) n
"1}nf (v)dv
xn(n-l)F(x) n-2f(x) { f(v)dv}dx + rnF(r) 11
"1
v
xg
2 (x)dx + r[G2 (r) - G^(r)]
r
f(v)dv
r
= E(w
2
|sale)[l-G*(r)]
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Hence u^ - implies E(w | sale) = E(w
2
|sale). If u^ < 0, then
b(v,r) > b*(v,r) for all v > r, so that the above chain implies
E(wJsale)[l-Ghr)] =
l n
rV
1b(v,r)g
n
(v)dv
r
>
I b*(v,r)g^(v)dv
= E(w
2
|sale)[l-G^(r)].
Kence u!" < implies E(w..|sale) > E(w„|sale).
An easy corrolary of lemma 2 is that the first price auction is
preferred ex ante by the seller if he is risk neutral, and by the bid-
ders if they are risk neutral. A risk neutral seller prefers the first
price auction because, by lemma 2, he can achieve expected profits in
the first price auction at least as great as in the second price auction
by simply setting the reservation price in the first price auction the
same as in the second price auction. (Of course, theorem 2 says he can
do even better by setting r. < r„ if bidders are risk averse.) Risk
neutral bidders, on the other hand, prefer the first price auction be-
cause r.. < r„ results in a lower expected sale price in the first price
auction. This follows because r_ < r
?
implies b*(v,r..) < b*(v,r„), so
that the expected sale price in the first price auction with r. is less
than the expected sale price in a first price auction with r„, which by
lemma 2 is equal to the expected sale price in the second price auction
with r . Without formal proof, proposition 5 summarizes these comments.
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Proposition 5 ; If it = u" = 0, then both the buyers and the seller are
indifferent between the auctions. If u" = and u!J < (resp. u" <
and u" = 0) , then the seller (resp. buyers) strictly prefer the first
price auction.
In many settings both the seller and the buyers will prefer the
first price auction, i.e., the first price auction will ex ante Pareto
dominate the second price auction. A sufficient condition for this is
that the risk aversion of bidders be small, and that F satisfy
A3. For any v > r, let b = b*(v,r). Then
^ 1(b)" (v_b) - 1 '
Assumption A3 is similar to the assumption that b (v,r) < 1 (see (3)).
*
The assumption that b (v,r) < 1 is intuitively reasonable and, because
b*(r,r) = r and b*(v,r) < v, must be true on average. If F is the
uniform distribution then A3 is satisfied, but in general it is not clear
what assumptions on F imply A3. It is clear, however, that A3 is stronger
than necessary for the following theorem.
Theorem 2 ; If A3 holds, then the seller strictly prefers the first price
auction whenever u" < or u" < 0.
Theorem 2 implies the existence of settings in which the first price
auction Pareto dominates ex ante the second price auction. Suppose F sat-
isfies A3, and that u" < 0. Then by theorem 2, the seller strictly pre-
fers the first price auction. By proposition 5, risk neutral bidders
also strictly prefer the first price auction. Continuity therefore
-17-
implies that given A3 and any u„ with u" < 0, the bidders as well as
the seller prefer the first price auction if the bidders are not too
risk averse.
The proof of Theorem 2 requires a lemma. Assumption A3 is used only
in proving this lemma.
1 2
Lemma 3 ; Given v > r, let b = b*(v,r). If G (v) = G (b) , then
* n n
b*(v,r)g2 (b) < g*(v).
Proof ; We have
gn
(v)
nF(v) n
"1
f(v)
g
2
(b) n(n-l)F(b) n
"2 (l-F(b))f(b)
G*(v)f(v)
(n-l)F(b) n
*2 (l-F(b))F(v)f(b)
G
2 (b)f(v)
(n-l)F(b) n
~2 (l-F(b))F(v)f(b)
=
[nF(b) n
"1
-(n-l)F(b) P ]f(v)
(n-l)F(b) n
~ 2 (l-F(b))F(v)f(b)
f(v)F(b) n-1 " F(b)
" F(v)f(b) 1 - F(b)
f(v)F(b)
F(v)f(b) *
-18-
Now, by (3) and A3,
b*(v,r) = (n-1) §£} (v-b)
-
f(v)F(b) , n f(b)_ f .
- F(v)f(b) (n_1) ?(bT Cv
"b)
f(v)F(b)
-F(v)f(b) *
* 2 1
Hence b(v,r)g (b) < g (v) . av n n "
Proof of Theorem 2 : If u" = 0, then by hypothesis u£ < and the seller
prefers the first price auction by proposition 5. Hence we can assume
u'
1
< 0. We shall prove that the seller prefers the first price auction
whenever both auctions have the same reservation price r, which implies
that he prefers the first price auction when he can set r.. ^ r_.
The seller's profit in auction j is
if a sale occurs
if no sale occurs.
By a theorem of Hadar and Russell [1969], the seller will prefer the random
variable z to z„ if z. strictly stochastically dominates z„ in the
second degree. This we show. Let K. and k. respectively denote the
distribution and density functions of z
.
. We must show that for any
x >_ 0,
K.. (z)dz <_ K (z)dz,(8)
and that strict inequality holds in (8) for some x.
-19-
In either auction, the probability of no sale is the probability that
y < r, where y = max(v n ,...,v ). Also, z. cannot be between and r-c.
^n n 1' n j
Hence,
IL(z) = K (z) = G^r) for <_ z < r-c.
In the case of a sale, Wo is the maximum of r and the second greatest value,
Hence
2 —
K„(z) = G (z+c) for r-c < z < v-c.
2 n — —
The sale price in the first price auction is w^ = b(y ,r). Therefore,
if again we let a be defined by b(cr(p),r) = p,
K-^z) = Pr(b(y
n
,r)-c<z)
= Pr(y
n
< a (z+c))
= G (o(z+c)) for r-c <_ z £b(v,r)-c.
_ *
Finally, K (z) = 1 for z >_ b(v,r)-c. (See figure 1.) Let iL be the
distribution of z when bidders are risk neutral. Since b*(v,r) £b(v,r),
K^(z) <_ K. (z) for any z >_ r-c. Hence, instead of showing (8), we need
only show that for all x > 0,
(9)
x ^
K (z)dz <_
r-c ' r-c
K
2
(z)dz,
and that this inequality is strict for some x.
Let 7 = inf{z > r-c|K*(z) > K„(z)}. Since K*(r-c) = G1 (r) < G (r) = K (r-c),
—
' 1 — z 1 n n l
z > r-c. Therefore
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c£<r)
G^r)
b(v,r)-c v-c
Figure 1
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r-c
K-(z)dz <
x
r-c
K
2
(z)dz
for all r-c < x < z. Hence it remains only to show (9) for z <^ x <_ v.
Now, lemma 2 and ulj = imply
E( Z;L ) = E(w1-c|yn > r)Pr(yn > r)
= E(w
2
-c|y
n
>_ r)Pr(y
n
> r) = E(z
2
).
Therefore, evaluation of E(z.) via integration by parts yields
K
1
(z)dz =
J
K
2
(z)dz.
r-c " 'r-c
Hence (9) holds for z <_x <_v if kT(z) >_ K (z) for all z > z.
* —
Assume K- (z
fi
) < K2 (z ) for some z fi > z. Therefore there exists
_ * *
z <_ z <_ z„ for which K- (z) = K„(z) and k.. (z) <_ k„(z). As z must be be-
tween r-c and b*(v,r)-c, this implies that
g^(G(z+c))a f (z+c) = k*(z) <k
2
(z) = g^(z+c).
Substituting v = o(z+c), b = b*(v,r) = z+c, and o'(z+c) = 1/b (v,r),
we obtain
g*<» ±VV ' r)gn(b) * 11 *
This contradicts lemma 3, since G (v) = G (c(z+c) = Kn (z) = K„(z) =n n l l
G
2 (z+c) = G2 (b). Therefore K*(z) > K„(z) for all z > 7, so that (9)
n n 1 —• / —
holds for all r-c <_ x <_ v. q
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7 . Conclusion
It is widely held that second price auctions are better than first
price auctions. One reason, first given by Vickrey [1961], is based on
9
an ex post analysis of outcome efficiency. In an example in which the
distributions of bidders' values differ, Vickrey finds that in a first
price auction the item will sometimes be sold to a bidder who does not
value it the most. The first price auction exhibits the same inefficiency
in an example of Cox [1978], in which bidders have varying degrees of
risk aversion. These authors conclude that second price auctions are
preferable, since in a second price auction the item is never sold to a
bidder other than the one who values it the most.
However, neither Vickrey nor Cox allow the seller to set different
reservation prices in the two auctions. If the seller has this flexi-
bility, theorem 1 states that he sets a lower reservation price in the
first price auction, provided he and/or the bidders are risk averse.
In some states of the world, therefore, the outcome of the first price
auction Pareto dominates the outcome of the second price auction because
only in the first price auction does a sale occur. Hence, if agents are
risk averse, if the seller sets reservation prices, and if bidders vary
in ways other than their realized values, then neither auction is the
most efficient in all states of the world.
An ex post analysis results in an unambiguous recommendation of one
auction on the basis of efficiency only if the outcome of that auction
Pareto dominates the outcome of the other auction in every state of
the world. This is not the case, even in the simplest setting. One
must therefore consider the probabilities attached to various states,
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individual attitudes towards risk, and, of course, the equilibrium out-
comes of each auction in order to evaluate ex ante welfare.
This approach was taken in section 6. Given an assumption, the
seller was shown in theorem 2 to prefer the first price auction, in
terms of the expected utility of its outcome, to the second price auc-
tion whenever he and/or the bidders are risk averse. This result holds
even if the seller must set the same reservation price in both auctions.
Since he actually sets a lower reservation price in the first price
auction, the buyers also prefer, ex ante , the first price auction in
situations where the seller is risk averse and they are approximately
risk neutral. Therefore, in a large class of situations the first price
auction Pareto dominates the second price auction ex ante .
This result is at first glance contradicted by the results of two
recent papers. Harris and Raviv [1978] show, essentially, that with-
in the class of ex ante efficient, two-bidder mechanisms, a second price
auction maximizes a risk neutral seller's expected utility. ~ However,
their result is derived for risk neutral bidders, which implies, as they
point out, that a first price auction yields the same (maximal) expected
profit to the seller as does a second price auction. If the bidders are
risk averse then the seller's expected profit is greater in the first
price auction, as Harris and Raviv also point out. If only the seller
is risk averse, then the second price auction is not in the class of
ex ante efficient mechanisms, since it can be dominated by the first
price auction.
Myerson [1978] also characterizes, within a large class of auctions,
an auction that maximizes the seller's expected utility. This auction,
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in our framework, is a second price auction. However, Myerson also as-
sumes that the seller and bidders are risk neutral. His result conse-
quently implies that the first price auction, as well as the second price
auction, maximizes the seller's expected profit when bidders are risk
neutral. If the seller or the bidders are risk averse, the nature of
the seller's optimal auction is an open question. But it is not gen-
erally a second price auction.
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Footnotes
1. Results are unchanged if several items are to be sold, as long as
each buyer purchases at most one item. See Vickrey [1961] and
Harris and Raviv [1978].
2. This reservation price r resembles most closely the "cooperatively
set minimum prices" used in commodity auctions (Cassady, 1967,
p . 230) . Evidently these minimum prices are announced by the
seller and explicitly set so as to keep sale prices high. Cassady
notes that a minimum price is usually set above the price the
seller could obtain in a secondary market, which is in accordance
with my finding below that the seller sets r > c.
3. Cassady [1967, p. 227] reports that often the existence but not the
value of a reserve price is announced in oral auctions. (Cassady
distinguishes between reserve prices and the minimum prices dis-
cussed in footnote 2.)
4. Particular circumstances may facilitate the equilibrium. Bidders'
expectations about an unannounced r are more likely to be correct
if they know the seller's cost c, since then they can calculate
the seller's optimal r. The equilibrium also requires that the
seller's threat to not accept bids falling in the interval (c,r)
be credible. For an unannounced reservation price, credibility
is perhaps enhanced if the seller uses a third-party auctioneer
and if he customarily sells in auctions.
5. Samuelson [1978] obtains this result for u" = 0.
6. Theorem l(i) can alternatively be obtained as a corollary to
lemma 2 of the next section. Samuelson [1978] obtains l(i) in
this way.
7. It can be shown that b (v,r) <_ 1 if f ' (v) <_ 0.
8. Hadar and Russell's [1969] theorem is actually for weak preference.
A simple modification of their proof yields strict preference when
u" < and strict second degree stochastic dominance is assumed.
9. Another reason Vickrey [1961] gives for preferring second price
auctions is that they, having dominant strategy equilibria, do
not give a bidder an incentive to waste resources on gathering
and processing information about the behavior of other bidders.
This type of information acquisition is studied, in a somewhat
different model, in Matthews [1979].
10. Cox attributes the example to John Ledyard.
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11. The notion of ex ante used by Harris and Raviv [1978] is different
than the one used here. They calculate a bidder's expected util-
ity conditional on his own value, while here it is calculated un-
conditionally, i.e., from the point of view of a bidder who does
not yet know his own value. Independence of the values implies
that the two notions of ex ante yield the same result for risk
neutral bidders, namely, that they prefer whichever auction has
the lower reservation price. Under either definition of ex ante
,
therefore, the first price auction is Pareto superior to the
second price auction when the seller is risk averse and the bid-
ders are risk neutral.
-27-
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